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SEA CHANGES IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION:
STRONGER AGENCY AND STRONGER LAWS
By Dee Pridgen
Abstract: After the financial crisis of 2008, Congress responded by
enacting new laws that changed the direction and theoretical underpinning
of consumer protection in the financial sector. The Consumer Financial
Protection Agency, formed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, is a new and stronger agency for
consumers. Two pieces of legislation, the Mortgage Reform and AntiPredatory Lending Act (Title XIV of Dodd-Frank), and the Credit Card
Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act (Credit CARD Act) of
2009, are stronger laws ensuring the safety of consumer financial products.
These new legislative and regulatory developments mark a shift from the
rational consumer theory that underlay the great disclosure statutes of the
late 1960’s and early 1970’s, such as the Truth in Lending Act, and toward
the rising influence of behavioral economics as a guiding force in consumer
protection. This article examines the new agency and the new laws,
explains how they differ from the prior governmental structure and
precepts, compares and contrasts rational consumer theory and behavioral
economics theory, demonstrates how the new developments are a reflection
of the modern theory, and then analyzes the advantages and disadvantages
of this new approach.
I. Introduction
American consumer protection law is undergoing a “sea-change”1 from
what it was over 30-40 years ago to what it is today. The developments
discussed in this article are the most important changes in the law since the


Carl M. Williams Professor of Law & Social Responsibility, University of Wyoming
College of Law. The author would like to thank Elizabeth Renuart, Sherrill Shaffer & Jeff
Sovern for their thoughtful and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1

The phrase “sea-change” originated in The Tempest, by William Shakespeare, 1610.
The full quote is:
Full fathom five thy father lies;
Of his bones are coral made;
Those are pearls that were his eyes:
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.
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heyday of federal consumer protection legislation in the late 1960’s and
early 1970’s.2 It is also a sea change, or paradigm shift, in the basic
underlying theories of consumer protection. This is reflected in the birth of
the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and in the shift from the
use of pure disclosures under the rational choice theory of economics, to a
system based on the more realistic view of consumer decision making as
revealed by behavioral economics. This article will provide an overview of
these changes, as well as the policies behind them.
As with most sea changes, a storm preceded these new developments.
Most agree that the financial crisis of 2008 led to the current outpouring of
new consumer legislation at the federal level.3 The financial crisis that
occurred following the collapse of the housing bubble, led to the loss of
billions of dollars in the value of securities, especially mortgage-backed
securities. When the stock market fell to record lows, a deep recession
ensued. With the recession came a rise in unemployment, a loss in the
value of homes, and an increase in debt.4 Storm clouds that foreshadowed
the financial tempest came in the form of a rise in subprime lending,
including new forms of toxic and exotic mortgages,5 and huge increases in
household debt. Due to the securitization of mortgage loans, in which loans
were bundled together and sold to investors, the risk of fraud and deception
in the making of the loan was left with the consumer and with investors
holding worthless mortgage-backed securities, while the real culprits were
protected from such risks.6
2

This earlier era saw the passage of the Truth in Lending Act and associated consumer
credit statutes now codified as the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 16011693. This was also the era that gave us the Magnuson-Moss Warranty/Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, now codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-2312.
3
See Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy and Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1147-1149 (2012); Kyle C. Worrell, Crisis as Catalyst for Federal
Regulation in Financial Markets: The Rise of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 195 (2010-2011).
4

FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (January, 2011). The Commission was
established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (Public Law 111-21).
AND

5

Consumer Federation of America, Allen J. Fishbein & Patrick Woodall, Exotic or
Toxic? An Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for Consumers and
Lenders
(May
2006),
available
at
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/housing/Exotic_Toxic_
Mortgage_Report0506.pdf.
6
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503 (2002); Christopher L.
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007).
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Many policy makers concluded that these bad outcomes were at least in
part caused by a lack of appropriate consumer protection regulation to curb
some of the worst abuses by Wall Street investment firms and big banks.
Congress filled this gap in 2009 and 2010 with an unprecedented wave of
federal consumer protection legislation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 20107 (Dodd-Frank Act) created a
new federal consumer protection agency, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau or CFPB, clothed with authority over all providers of
consumer financial services of all kinds, and charged with protecting
consumers from “unfair, deceptive or abusive” acts or practices in consumer
financial services.8 The Dodd-Frank Act also included the Mortgage
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, which contains a major overhaul
of the law of residential mortgages, including limits on unfair contract
clauses, broker compensation and a new requirement that all lenders base
loans on the consumer’s ability to repay, rather than solely on the
collateral.9 Just prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, in 2009,
Congress had passed the Credit CARD Act,10 which contained substantial
new consumer protections with regard to credit cards, including limits on
rate increases, reforms of creditor billing practices, and improvements on
required disclosures.
This article will provide an overview of these new laws, explain how
they differ from prior consumer protection laws, and will address the merits
of this new direction in consumer protection. Part II discusses the creation
of the CFPB, how it was based on the need to correct some structural flaws
in the architecture of consumer protection in the financial sector, as well as
the need for a consumer protection agency that could employ the insights of
behavioral economics to fashion more effective regulations. A contrast
between the new CFPB and the Federal Trade Commission, 11 which had
been the major federal consumer protection agency in the United States for
almost one hundred years, is also included in Part II. Part III describes a
related shift in consumer financial protection from the purely disclosure
remedies characteristic of the Truth in Lending Act, to the more substantive
limitations that are characteristic of the Credit CARD Act and the Mortgage
7

Pub. Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
12 U.S.C. §§ 5491-5531.
9
Pub. Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, title XIV (2010), codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639b-c. See generally DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M.
ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW Chapter 9A (West 2012-2013).
10
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637.
11
The FTC also has authority to regulate “unfair and deceptive acts or practices” as
well as “unfair methods of competition.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1), and has both a Bureau of
Consumer Protection and a Bureau of Competition.
8
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Reform Act. This change in focus is arguably based on a move from the
rational consumer choice theory that underpinned the Truth in Lending Act
and other earlier consumer protection legislation, to more of a reliance on
the relatively new field of behavioral economics. Part IV will describe in
more detail the provisions of the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act and the Credit CARD Act to demonstrate the move from a
reliance solely on consumer choice and rational choice theory, to a legal
regime based more on the teachings of behavioral economics. Part V will
conclude the article with an analysis of the disadvantages and advantages to
consumers of the new approach to consumer protection documented in the
preceding sections.
II. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
A. The Structural Flaws in Consumer Financial Protection
Prior to the creation of the CFPB, consumer financial protection at the
federal level was not working effectively for consumers, due in part to the
way it was set up. Under the federal umbrella statute known as the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, consumer protection for financial services
customers was spread out over several bank regulatory agencies and the
Federal Trade Commission,12 with each of the bank regulatory agencies
having sometimes conflicting missions of ensuring the safety and soundness
of their regulatory “clients.” No one agency focused on the whole spectrum
of consumer financial protection. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
has an overall consumer protection focus but no jurisdiction over banks.
The FTC only regulates nonbank entities that offer financial services.13
Bank regulatory agencies had jurisdiction over banks, but did not have an
overall consumer protection focus.14
While consumers under the prior regulatory scheme were not being well
served in their efforts to shop around for the best deal in credit products,
regulated banks could shop around for the best (least interfering) regulator
by choosing to be chartered by either the state or federal government. Those
regulators both enforced consumer protection and other rules on their
chartered entities, and derived revenues from them. Thus, if one chartering
12

15 U.S.C. § 1607, § 1681s, §1692l, and § 1693o.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
14
See Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 85-97 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (2008); Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency, Pew
Financial
Reform
Project
Briefing
Paper
#
3,available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Financial_Reform/Pew
-Levitan-CFPA.pdf.
13
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entity imposed unwelcome regulation on a bank, the regulated bank might
choose to change its charter to a more compatible agency. The competition
among agencies for regulatory clients was said to be a “race to the bottom”
because the banks chose, and the regulatory agencies offered, the least
possible amount of regulation despite the interest of consumers in
protection from certain abuses.15 Many states attempted to impose some
limits on federally-chartered banks that were alleged to be engaging in
predatory lending practices, but these state laws were preempted and the
federal regulators did not offer consumers equivalent protection.16 Indeed,
some critics viewed federal preemption as a covert effort to deregulate the
residential lending market.17 This strong federal preemption was extended
to subsidiaries of national banks as well.18 Also, under an historic ruling by
the Supreme Court in 1978, a federally-chartered bank would be governed
by the usury and other laws of the state in which the bank was located,
rather than where the borrower was located.19 This gave banks the
incentive to choose a federal charter and locate in states with very little
consumer protection regulation.
B. How the Legislation and the CFPB Address These Structural
Flaws

The Dodd-Frank Act addressed these structural issues regarding
consumer financial protection when it created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB).20 This move will change the face of consumer
protection for years to come. The new agency was formed by consolidating
the consumer protection divisions of existing bank regulatory agencies,
such as the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and placing them under the umbrella
of a single agency whose sole mission is consumer financial protection. 21
15

Adam Levitin, supra n. 14, at p. 6-7.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.3, 34.4, 7.4000, 7.4007, 7.4008, and 7.409.
17
Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2005).
18
See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
19
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S.
299 (1978).
20
The design of the new agency is widely credited to Elizabeth Warren, a Harvard
Law Professor (now a United States Senator) who acted as a Presidential Assistant to set up
the CFPB. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Issue # 5,
(Summer 2007).
21
12 U.S.C.A. § 5581.
16
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Thus, there is no incentive for either the regulator or the regulated entities to
shop around for a better deal because all of the regulatory authority over
consumer financial services is under one roof, as it were. Also, under the
current law, the applicable regulation does not depend on type of entity or
type of financial product, so there will be more of a level playing field
across all sectors of consumer financial services. Another feature of the
new law is that the CFPB has authority to enforce all the pre-existing
consumer financial services laws, the so-called “enumerated laws,” which
mostly consist of the statutes included in the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, such as the Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Electronic
Funds Transfer Act. These laws had previously been enforced by the FTC
and the bank regulatory agencies, with the Federal Reserve Board authoring
the relevant regulations.22
The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated much federal preemption of state
consumer protection law, so banks no longer have a motive to change
charters to get a better deal from the federal regulatory agencies. The new
law contains a specific preemption provision that cuts back significantly on
federal preemption and allows much more leeway for states to enforce their
own consumer protection laws in the area of consumer financial protection,
as long as the state laws are not inconsistent with federal law and are more
protective of consumers than the federal standard.23 Thus the federal law is
a floor or minimum level of consumer protection but states can be more
protective if they deem it necessary. This is the same type of preemption
standard as that found in the Truth in Lending Act,24 which allows the states
to act as laboratories for different consumer protection measures to be tried
out prior to adoption at the federal level. A possible downside of this
provision is that consumer credit providers may end up facing varying
requirements across different states, which can add to compliance costs.25
C. The CFPB Is More Powerful and Potentially More Effective
Than the FTC
When designing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Congress
had before it several different templates of regulatory agencies. First, the
traditional independent regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade
22

12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5481(12), (14), and 5564 & 5565,
12 U.S.C.A. § 5551(a)(1) & (2).
24
15 U.S.C.A. § 1610.
25
David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277
(2010).
23
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Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, were created by
Congress to operate outside of the direct control of the executive branch,
but with some oversight and involvement by both the federal legislature and
the executive branch.
These agencies also have some guarantees of
independence, such as set terms for Commissioners, and no veto powers.
The independent regulatory agencies are also funded by Congress and can
be controlled indirectly by that means. The Federal Reserve System has a
Board of Governors appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, much like the independent regulatory agencies, but it is also the
central banking system and derives much of its revenue from the banks that
participate in the federal reserve system.26 A percentage of this revenue
goes to fund the Federal Reserve Board, making it less dependent on
Congress than the other regulatory agencies.
The CFPB is different from the model of either the independent
regulatory agency as embodied by the FTC, or the Federal Reserve Board,
of which the CFPB is a part. The Federal Trade Commission was created
by Congress in 1914. It has been the major American consumer protection
agency since the 1930’s, when Congress added a specific consumer
protection mission to the FTC Act. In 2010, almost one hundred years after
the FTC was established , the legislation creating the CFPB used a template,
which is a bit of a hybrid between the independent regulatory agency model
and the Federal Reserve Board. There are several pertinent differences
between the CFPB and the FTC that make the CFPB arguably a stronger
and hence more effective protector of consumers than the FTC. Each of
these differences will be discussed in turn below.
First, the CFPB has a different funding mechanism than the FTC. The
CFPB is an “independent bureau” within the Federal Reserve System, 27 is
funded by revenues from Federal Reserve, and is guaranteed further
appropriations (within stated limits) on request by the CFPB Director.28
This is similar to the funding of other bank regulatory agencies, such as the
Federal Reserve itself, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
The FTC, by contrast, is funded by Congress, and has been limited in the
past by Congressional exercise of the “power of the purse.” For example,
when the FTC proposed to ban television advertising aimed at children in
the late 1970’s, a proposal known as the “kid-vid” rule, Congress cut off
funding for any FTC rule based on the “unfairness” prong of its statute. 29
26

http:www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pf.htm, Federal Reserve System, Purposes &
Functions, Chapter One, at p. 11 (last updated Aug. 24, 2011).
27
12 U.S.C.A. § 5491(a).
28
12 U.S.C.A. § 5497.
29
See J. Howard Beales, III, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory
Retrospective that Advises the Present, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 873, 878-880 (2004).
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Having the CFPB funded more like its bank regulatory predecessors, by
contrast, was intended by Congress when it wrote the legislation to avoid
such political turmoil and possibly undue strangulation of the agency.
A second difference between the CFPB and the FTC is the way the
agency is internally governed and organized. The CFPB is run by a single
director, appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, for a fiveyear term.30 By contrast, the FTC is run by five commissioners, also
appointed by the President and approved by the Senate for seven-year
staggered terms. No more than three FTC commissioners can be from the
same political party.31 The need for the FTC Commissioners to muster a
majority of their number to approve any action may provide somewhat of a
brake on the consumer protection activities of the FTC, whereas an agency
like the CFPB with a single director may be able to take action more swiftly
when needed to address emergent consumer issues.32 The CFPB also has
four “special function units” that focus on particular issues or populations,
within the new agency. These units include the Office of Fair Lending and
Equal Opportunity, the Office of Financial Education, the Office of Service
Member Affairs, and the Office of Financial Protection for Older
Americans.33 The FTC, on the other hand, historically has been divided
into a Bureau of Consumer Protection, a Bureau of Competition, and a
Bureau of Economics.
Third, the CFPB has authority to take action to prevent “unfair,
deceptive and abusive practices” within the scope of their jurisdiction, i.e.,
consumer financial service transactions.34 The FTC, on the other hand, has
authority over unfair or deceptive practices only.35 The field of unfair and
deceptive trade practices under the FTC Act has a long history and such
practices are well-defined both in policy statements and in case precedent.36
The unfairness standard is defined in the CFPB’s statute using the same

30

12 U.S.C.A. § 5491(b) & (c). The current CFPB director, Richard Cordray, is a
recess appointment whose term will run out in 2013. At that time the President will need to
appoint a director under the statute, which will require approval by the Senate. This
appointment has been the subject of political controversy, which may prove to be an
obstacle to the continuing work of the CFPB after the recess appointment expires.
31
15 U.S.C.A. § 41.
32
Note that the OCC also functions under a single director, not a commission.
33
12 U.S.C.A. § 5493(b)-(g).
34
12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(a).
35
15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a).
36
FTC
Policy
Statement
on
Deception
(1983),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm; FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness
(1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm, codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 45(n). See generally DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN,
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW, Chapters 9-11 (West, 2012-13 ed.).
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definition as in the FTC Act.37 The CFPB statute does not specifically
define “deceptive” practices, but the Bureau has indicated in its
“Examination Manual” that it will adopt the FTC policy statements and
precedents on the meaning of “deceptive practices” (as well as “unfair
practices”) in the financial services context.38 The CFPB’s additional
authority to curb “abusive practices” creates a new standard, defined in the
statute but not yet tested. The Act defines an “abusive” practice as one that
(1) Materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to
understand a term or condition of a consumer
financial product or service; or
(2) Takes unreasonable advantage of –
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the
consumer of the material risks, costs, or
conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect
the interests of the consumer in selecting or using
a consumer financial product or service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer
on a covered person to act in the interests of the
consumer.39
This standard provides the CFPB with a unique and flexible
authority to deal with abuses in the consumer financial services sector,40
and to issue rules or initiate enforcement actions to address the exploitation
of certain consumer behavioral biases by financial service providers.41
While the “abusive practices” power is broad and currently uncharted, the
statutory language does create a framework against which any CFPB
initiative based on this provision must be measured. Also, it should be
noted that while the CFPB may have a broader general statutory mandate
37

12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(c).
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervision and Examination Manual 2.0, at
178-181
(October
2012),
available
at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manualv2.pdf.
39
12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(d).
40
See Carey Alexander, Note, Abusive: Dodd-Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing
Struggle to Protect Consumers, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1108 (2011), for a general
discussion of the legislative history of this section and analysis of the types of activities to
which it might be applied. See also Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and
Consumer Financial Protection Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L.
118 (2011).
41
See Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, Arizona
Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 12-25, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126859.
38
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than the FTC by including coverage of “abusive” practices in addition to
unfair and deceptive practices, the CFPB’s authority is narrower in focus
than the FTC’s. It has authority only over persons who offer or provide
consumer financial products or services.
In addition, the CFPB’s
authorizing statute contains specific exemptions from CFPB jurisdiction of
merchants selling nonfinancial goods or services, motor vehicle dealers,
persons regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, persons
regulated by a state insurance regular, real estate agents, accountants, noncredit -extending tax preparers, attorneys and others.42 The CFPB’s
potential regulatory action thus affects a smaller segment of the economy,
but one that had proven particularly troublesome for consumers in the
recent financial crisis that led up to the legislation.
Fourth, the CFPB has a more efficient and straightforward
rulemaking authority than the FTC. As a tool to implement its statutory
mandate, the CFPB has general rulemaking authority to curb unfair,
deceptive and abusive practices using standard federal rulemaking
procedures,43 as contained in the Administrative Procedures Act’s (APA)
notice and comment process.44 The CFPB’s regulations are subject to
review, however, and can be set aside if the Financial Stability Oversight
Council determines that the regulation “would put the safety and soundness
of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system
of the United States at risk.”45 The FTC, on the other hand, did not obtain
industry-wide rulemaking authority to regulate unfair and deceptive trade
practices until 1975, more than 50 years after the agency was established.
The FTC’s rulemaking authority was part of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
- FTC Improvement Act,46 and it contains many procedural hurdles that
have had the effect of preventing most FTC trade regulation rules from
being promulgated.
One problem with so-called Magnuson-Moss
rulemaking at the FTC is that it is an adjudication-like process, involving
virtually unlimited witnesses and parties, which results in an inefficient and
drawn-out process.47 The result has been that for the past several decades,
42

15 U.S.C. A. § 5517.
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5512 and 5531(b).
44
5 U.S.C.A. §§ 553 and 706.
45
12 U.S.C.A. § 5513(a). The CFPB’s regulations are also subject to the normal
rulemaking checks, such as the small business impact requirement, 5 U.S.C.A. § 601, the
Congressional cost-benefit review requirement, 5 U.S.C.A. § 801, and a cost benefit
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of
Management and Budget. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3501.
46
15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(a)(1)(B). Further restrictions on the FTC’s rulemaking process
were added by the FTC Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374
(1980), codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b-3.
47
See Testimony of Dee Pridgen before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer
43
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the FTC has issued regulations only when specifically directed to do so by
Congress, and where it is authorized to use APA notice and comment
rulemaking, as it was in the Telemarketing Sales Act.48 APA rulemaking is
a much more efficient process and is the norm for most federal agencies
other than the FTC. As a result of this legislative peculiarity, the FTC has
not issued many regulations under its more general “unfair and deceptive
trade practices” authority.49 Thus, the CFPB could potentially be better
situated than the FTC to issue rules governing unfair, deceptive or abusive
financial services practices in the future. Whether and how the CFPB will
use this rulemaking authority remains to be seen.
Despite the potential for bureaucratic warfare between two agencies
both charged with consumer protection, the CFPB and the FTC are poised
to become partners rather than rivals. The CFPB has been given
enforcement authority over unfair, deceptive and abusive practices engaged
in by consumer financial service providers, as well as enforcement authority
for specific consumer credit statutes.50 Meanwhile, the FTC still has
authority to enforce its own statute as well as to enforce the consumer credit
statutes (concurrently with the CFPB) with regard to nonbank entities.51
The statute specifically requires the CFPB to coordinate with the FTC and
other relevant agencies “to promote consistent regulatory treatment of
consumer financial and investment products and services.”52
As to unfair, deceptive or abusive practices under either agency’s
jurisdiction, there is no private right of action,53 which limits enforcement to
the relevant government agencies. This includes state governments in some
cases as well, given that there are provisions for state government
enforcement of matters under the jurisdiction of both the CFPB and the
FTC.54 However, there remains a pre-existing private right of action to
Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance, United States Senate, (March 17, 2010).
48
15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(b), resulting in the promulgation of the Telemarketing Sales
Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 310.
49
DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION
AND THE LAW, § § 12:10-12:14 (West, 2012-13 ed.).
50
Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy and Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1147-1149 (2012).
51
12 U.S.C.A. § 5581(b)(5).
52
12 U.S.C.A. § 5495. See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 5514(c).
53
There is nothing in either the CFPB statute or in the FTC Act specifically creating a
private right of action. A theory that such a cause of action was implied in the FTC Act
was definitively rejected in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See generally DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND THE LAW, § 12:43 (West, 2012-13 ed.).
54
See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5552 for the CFPB. Many federal consumer laws have
provisions for state government enforcement, including many that are jointly enforced by
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enforce specific consumer credit statutes, such as TILA, ECOA, FCRA or
FDCPA,55 which has been in place since the outset of these statutes.
The CFPB was created to be more powerful than the wellestablished FTC, due in part to a growing realization by Congress that
consumers needed an agency that could act more quickly and effectively to
protect consumers than the FTC or the bank regulatory agencies that
preceded it. In addition, the CFPB is poised to take advantage of the
current shift in consumer behavior theory underpinning the law of consumer
protection, a shift away from the rational consumer choice theory that
supported a predominantly consumer disclosure regime, and toward the
more realistic and evidence-based theory of behavioral economics.
III. From “Homo Economicus” to Real Consumers
A. New Consumer Protection Law Tilts Toward “Behavioral
Economics”
The creation of the CFPB was a distinct innovation in the design of
consumer protection agencies. As discussed above, the CFPB is neither an
independent regulatory agency nor a bank regulatory agency, but is
something new and more potent, meant to deal more effectively with a
specific consumer protection sector, namely financial services. But the
creation of the CFPB itself is not the only big change in the consumer
protection landscape. In addition, certain federal statutes passed in 2009
and 2010 represent a major shift in their underlying theoretical basis from
the older consumer credit laws.
The older statutes and associated
regulations relied on the hypothetical rational consumer (“homo
economicus”) to make rational choices when presented with all relevant
information. The new laws that will be discussed below, on the other hand,
incorporate the findings of behavioral economics, namely that real
consumers do not always act rationally in their own self-interest in making
marketplace decisions. Two areas in particular, involving residential
mortgages (addressing predatory residential mortgage lending practices)
and credit cards, are examples of this shift in legislative philosophy.
the FTC. See Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Concurrent
Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 53 (2011).
55
15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (TILA); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n & 1681o (FCRA); 15 U.S.C.A. §
1691e (ECOA); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k (FDCPA).
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The last big wave of federal consumer protection can be traced back to
the late 1960’s and early 1970’s when the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and
related consumer credit laws were passed and were codified under the
umbrella statute – the Consumer Credit Protection Act.56 Those laws,
especially the TILA which aimed to enhance comparative shopping for
consumer credit, were based on the economic theory that informed
consumers would choose wisely in the marketplace. It was presumed that
if the law provided consumers with standardized information about the
comparative costs of competing credit products, then the competitive
marketplace would be able to function to maximize consumer welfare.57
This is known as rational choice theory, premised on the existence of
“homo economicus,” a rational consumer choice maker, who by making
rational choices based on individual preferences, will lead to the best
economic outcome for the market as a whole.58 Based on this theory, much
of consumer credit law took a pure disclosure approach to consumer
protection, in which consumers were given relevant information about
competing credit products, and were expected to choose the one that
maximized their welfare.59 Disclosure of information was viewed as a
panacea for imperfections in the market for consumer credit, because in
theory disclosures of information alone could protect consumers and
promote competition, while imposing the least cost on the market and
meeting with the least amount of political resistance.60

56

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN,
CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW, Chapter 4 (West, 2012-13 ed.).
57

See Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth in
Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233 (1991); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and
High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA.
L. REV. 807 (2003).
58
See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323,
325-328 (2008); Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is that What I Want?: Competition Policy and
the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 899-901 (2010).
59
Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit:
The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807 (2003).
60
Dee Pridgen, Putting Some Teeth in TILA: From Disclosure to Substantive
Regulation in the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, 24 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 615 (2012).
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The impetus for the recently manifested change in approach to
consumer protection in the financial sector came from the work of
behavioral economics scholars. This research, which has resulted in the
publication of influential studies and articles from the 1990’s to the 2000’s
and present, questioned the premise that consumers would always act
rationally in their own self-interest if presented with adequate information.61
Basically, these scholars concluded that rational choice theory does not
accurately describe how consumers actually behave in the marketplace.62
Behavioral economics scholars focused on certain cognitive barriers that
prevent most consumers from choosing rationally, and also revealed that
marketers of credit products may have actually exploited these flaws in
consumer decision-making for their own benefit.63 The new laws in the
consumer finance sector appear to take this new learning about the
consumer marketplace behavior to heart, and as a result, we are seeing laws
that feature more substantive limits, more pro-consumer default provisions,
and more disclosures based on consumer-behavior studies.
B. Why Disclosures Alone Did Not Prevent the Financial Crisis
Truth in Lending disclosures were well-established in the period leading
up to the foreclosure crisis of 2007-08. They are required for mortgage
loans, which tend to be for relatively large sums of money in transactions
that often take several weeks to be finalized, as well as for the opening of a
credit card account, which can be approved on the spot or in a very short
time. In both situations, consumers did not appear to heed the warnings of
minefields ahead that were spelled out in the federally-mandated disclosures
and ultimately found themselves unable to pay their debts. 64 These
problems could have included a pre-determined jump in monthly payments
or interest rates to unaffordable levels after the expiration of an initially
61

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249
(2006); Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 749 (2008); Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135 (2009).
62
Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat Choice: Some Thoughts on the
Relationship Among Rationality, Markets, and Human Beings, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091
(2005).
63
See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).
64
Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law
Or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761
(2010).
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lower payment period, and pre-payment penalties that would make
refinancing of a mortgage too expensive at the time when the payments
became unaffordable. Other aspects of many mortgage loans that should
have waved large red flags in the face of a rational decision maker with a
limited income include variable rates, “interest only” payments, negative
amortization, and balloon payments.65 As for credit card deals, the
solicitation disclosures should have warned consumers that the initial low
rate was set to expire in a relatively short time, that the creditor could
change the contract terms at any time, and that there were going to be hefty
penalties for late payments and over-the-limit charges.66 So why did so
many consumers appear to choose irrationally even when presented with all
the relevant terms and costs?
For the mortgage loan consumer, buying a home is often said to be the
largest financial investment in a person’s lifetime. And yet instead of
resulting in more caution, such a high-stakes transaction sometimes results
in the triggering of certain defense mechanisms that may cloud rational
judgment.67 When faced with such a great deal of information, consumers
may experience “information overload” and will only consider those
variables that are most salient, such as the amount of the closing costs and
the initial monthly payment.68 Borrowers who feel insecure about their
creditworthiness may be overly trusting of a broker or lender representative,
even if what the broker/lender says is contradicted by written disclosures.69
65

Consumer Federation of America, Allen J. Fishbein & Patrick Woodall, Exotic or
Toxic? An Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for Consumers and
Lenders
(May
2006),
available
at
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/housing/Exotic_Toxic_
Mortgage_Report0506.pdf.
66

15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a [12 C.F.R. § 1026.5a].
Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological
Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory
Lending, 16 PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW 85 (2010).
68
See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 725 (2005); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 768 (2006).
69
See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing
Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617
(2009); Jessica M. Choplin, Debra Pogrund Stark & Jasmine N. Ahmad, A Psychological
Investigation of Consumer Vulnerability to Fraud: Legal and Policy Implications, 35 LAW
& PSYCHOL. REV. 61 (2011).
67
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Also, due to the “endowment effect” of feeling they already own the home
being financed, consumers may not want to unwind the transaction once
unfavorable credit terms are presented.70 Another well-known behavioral
tendency of most consumers is to be overly optimistic about the future.
Thus, when faced with a contract disclosure that rates or payments are
likely to go up at a future point in time, many consumers will optimistically
assume that real estate prices will also go up, or that their own incomes will
rise, so that future penalties, balloon payments or the inability to pay higher
payments will not be a problem.71 This type of unrealistic optimism or
wishful thinking can lead consumers to make choices that are not
necessarily in their own self-interest.
Irrational consumer behavior can also play a role in credit card
choices in ways that are not likely to be alleviated by disclosure alone.
Credit card debt skyrocketed in the years prior to the recent financial
crisis.72 Just as mortgage lenders were required to make certain information
disclosures to consumers prior to their commitment to a loan, federal
consumer protection law requires credit card issuers to make certain credit
cost information disclosures to consumers with any credit card
solicitation.73 Quite often, card issuers offered low “teaser rates” or “no
annual fee” in credit card offers, which were followed by increased rates or
the imposition of an annual fee after the card offer had been accepted and
the consumer had run up a balance.74 Credit card agreements specified that
terms could be changed by the card issuer at any time, but most consumers
may have optimistically assumed that this would not affect them. Also,
consumers are often found to be “myopic” in the sense that they focus on
the short-term costs and do not see that far into the future when making
marketplace choices. Another phenomenon that may occur is “hyperbolic
discounting,” by which consumers may overvalue the immediate costs and
70

Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 630, 734 (1999).
71
Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073 (2009).
72
Credit card debt increased by 25% in the ten years preceding 2009, and reached
$963 billion in January of that year. Also, at that time, more than 75% of all U.S. families
had a credit card and 44% carried a balance. House Report 111-88 (April 27, 2009).
73
15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a [12 C.F.R. § 1026.5a].
74
See, e.g., Rossman v. Fleet Bank, 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002).
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benefits of a credit card deal, while undervaluing the future costs and
benefits.75 Thus, a fully-disclosed temporary low teaser rate in a credit card
agreement may encourage consumers to accept the card, and borrow fairly
heavily during the teaser rate period, on the assumption that they will pay
off the balance before the low rate expires. Optimistically, consumers may
also assume that when the rate goes up, that they will cease using the card,
or use it less, which is not always the case.76 In addition to rates, all
potential fees associated with credit cards are required to be disclosed prior
to the account opening.77 However, certain “back end” fees and penalties
such as over-the-limit fees, late fees, and penalty rates are not “salient” to
consumers in choosing credit cards, even though they are fully disclosed,
because these items do not take effect until later, if at all. Even consumers
who notice these fees and potential rate increases may optimistically
assume that they will not charge over their limit, will not pay late and will
not default, so they do not factor in these costs when choosing credit
cards.78 Once consumers incur these additional costs, they face switching
costs to change to another card. Such costs include time spent shopping for
information on alternatives, paying off or transferring the balance on their
current card, changing previously established online or automatic payments
with their bank, and so on. Thus, the initial short-sighted choice of a credit
card is somewhat costly to correct.
IV. New Substantive Provisions for Consumers under New
Federal Laws

Given the shortcomings of the pure disclosure approach, as outlined
above, Congress changed course in the areas of residential mortgage loans
and credit cards. In two major consumer protection laws, the Mortgage
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010 and the Credit CARD Act
of 2009, Congress took more of a substantive approach to consumer
75

Jonathan Slowik, Comment, Credit CARD Act II: Expanding Credit Card Reform
by Targeting Behavioral Biases, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1292, 1311-1313 (2012).
76
Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based & Opportunistic Pricing in Credit
Cards, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 339 (2011).
77
12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b) [12 C.F.R. § 1026.5a(b)] .
78
Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 967 (2012).
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protection, combined with improved disclosures based on consumer
behavior research. The substantive approach relies less on the informed
rational consumer to make the right choice based on mandated disclosures
and more on the law to provide minimum standards of fair dealing with
consumers. Some say this new type of law will result in the unmooring of
consumer protection law from its foundation in the consumer welfare
theories of antitrust economics.79 Others say this new approach is a more
realistic and effective way to protect consumers.
A. Residential Mortgage Loans
It is commonly agreed that the prevalence of certain types of “toxic”
or “exotic” subprime mortgages, that contained complex and consumer
unfriendly clauses, may have contributed to the rash of mortgage
foreclosures that started in 2007-2008. When housing prices started to
plummet, many consumers realized they were locked into loans that they
could not afford due to increasing adjustable rates, “teaser” rates that were
replaced with much higher rates and payments, sky high balloon payments,
prepayment penalties that prevented refinancing, and financing
arrangements such as “interest only” payments that resulted in negative
amortization on their property.80 In response, Congress passed Title XIV of
the Dodd-Frank Act, which was called the Mortgage Reform and AntiPredatory Lending Act of 2010.81 This law is set to come into effect in
early 2013,82 and it contains many pro-consumer provisions that go well
beyond disclosure and rational consumer choice.83 At the same time,
disclosure and consumer choice has not been abandoned as a regulatory
stance. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act also contains some specific directions
to the new CFPB to improve the usefulness and readability of early
mortgage disclosures.
The CFPB is charged with combining and improving the readability
of early mortgage loan cost disclosures by combining the two separate
79

Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies At
War With Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216 (2012).
80
Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future
Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1252-1254 (2011).
81
Pub. Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
82
The effective date of most of the provisions of the Mortgage Reform Act is January
21, 2013. Pub. L. 111-203, Sec. 1400(c), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
83
See generally Julie R. Caggiano, Jennifer L. Dozier, Richard P. Hackett, & Arthur
B. Axelson, Mortgage Lending Developments: A New Federal Regulator and Mortgage
Reform under the Dodd-Frank Act, 66 BUS. LAW. 457 (Feb. 2011).
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disclosures that had previously been mandated by two different regulatory
agencies, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) under TILA and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).84 This new disclosure will replace
two confusing and sometimes conflicting disclosures under the old law that
came from FRB and HUD.85 The CFPB in 2011 launched an extensive
“Know Before You Owe” campaign to elicit comments on the disclosures,
and conducted extensive consumer testing prior to issuing the proposed
combined disclosure.86 The revised disclosure promises to be a major
improvement over the prior disclosures and hopefully can guide consumers
to more appropriate mortgage loans. One very striking feature of the
proposed disclosure, at least to those schooled in the teachings of the Truth
in Lending Act, is that the traditional unitary cost measure for consumer
credit, the Annual Percentage Rate or APR,87 will be relegated to page three
of the disclosure, whereas it was formerly the most prominent feature of the
TILA disclosure. The CFPB found that contrary to the hopes of the framers
of TILA, most consumers still do not understand what the APR is. The
agency also found that the APR has become a less accurate yardstick of
mortgage costs due in part to the prevalence of adjustable rate mortgages
and open-end home equity lines of credit, making it is impossible to predict
the actual cost of credit for these types of loans. 88
Thus, the new
disclosure will put the “interest rate” on the first page rather than the APR.
In addition to improving the existing disclosures, the new legislation
contains an array of substantive consumer protections for mortgage loan
consumers in areas where disclosure and consumer choice alone were
deemed insufficient. The CFPB is required to issue new regulations to
implement these new requirements.89 The main areas of substantive
reform include:

84

12 U.S.C.A. § 5532(f).
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Integrated Mortgage Disclosures under the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth In Lending Act
(Regulation Z), Proposed rule with request for public comment, 77 Fed. Reg. 51116
(August 23, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB2012-0028-0001.
86
Id. See also www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe.
87
The regulation requires that the disclosure of the APR be accompanied by a brief
description such as “the cost of your credit as a yearly rate.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(e) [12
C.F.R. § 1026.18(e)].
88
Richard H. Thaler, A Chance to Make Mortgage Shopping Easier, The New York
Times, Business Day (Aug. 18, 2012).
89
12 U.S.C.A. § 5538. Note that these provisions of the law do not go into effect until
either January 21, 2013 or when the CFPB issues the relevant regulations, whichever
comes first. Pub. L. 111-203, Sec. 1400(c), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
85
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Universal requirement of consumer “ability to repay” as a
condition for all residential mortgages;90
Creation of a “safe harbor” for creditors who offer “qualified
mortgages” that have certain characteristics that are
favorable to consumers;91
Ban on mortgage brokers steering consumers into
unfavorable loans and on accepting “yield spread premiums”
as compensation;92
Strict limits on prepayment penalties;93
Ban on the financing of “single premium” credit insurance;94
Prohibition on pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in
most dwelling-secured consumer loans;95 and
Imposition of “appraisal independence requirements” in all
consumer credit transactions secured by the principal
dwelling of the consumer.96

Highlights of the main substantive provisions of the Mortgage Reform
Act are summarized below.97
First, the new law has an “ability to repay” requirement. Although
one would think that creditors and consumers alike would naturally want to
assure themselves that the borrower had the ability to repay their loans, this
was not always the case. One of the practices that allegedly contributed to
the foreclosure crisis was that banks and other institutions were lending to
people who could not afford the loans they were being offered. Sometimes
this practice stemmed from the idea of foreclosing if needed when there was
a default, i.e., lending based on collateral. In other cases the improvident
loan deals were fueled by unscrupulous brokers who may have encouraged
90

15 U.S.C. §1639c(a)(1).
15 U.S.C. §1639c(b).
92
15 U.S.C. §1639b(c)(1). This prohibition on YSP was foreshadowed by a Federal
Reserve Board regulation that contained a very similar provision. 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d).
93
15 U.S.C. §1639c(c).
94
15 U.S.C. §1639c(d).
95
15 U.S.C. §1639c(e)(1).
96
15 U.S.C. §1639e.
97
For a more complete description of all the provisions, see Dee Pridgen, Putting
Some Teeth in TILA, : From Disclosure to Substantive Regulation in the Mortgage Reform
and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 615 (2012).
91
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false or undocumented loan applications and inflated appraisals to increase
their commissions and who then passed on the loans to lenders who would
have to deal with the inevitable default. Also, when mortgages were sold
to investors, via “securitization,” the originators could collect their fees and
let the consumer worry about making payments or suffer foreclosure
because the investors, protected by the “holder-in-due course doctrine,” did
not bear much risk from whatever legal problems there were with the
original loan.98 Consumers also underestimated the risk of foreclosure due
to the previously discussed “optimism” bias and other cognitive barriers.99
Thus, the new law’s universal extension of an “ability to repay”
requirement for residential mortgages is a big step forward for consumers.
Mortgage lenders will have to engage in more responsible lending and will
no longer be allowed to engage in asset-based lending that ignores the
consequences of such practices on individual consumers.100
Second, related to the “ability to repay” requirement, is the
provision of a “safe harbor” compliance alternative for lenders who might
otherwise have to provide extensive documentation to prove that consumers
have the ability to repay. If lenders offer a so-called “qualified mortgage”
that has certain pro-consumer characteristics, they will be presumed to have
complied with the “ability to repay” requirement.101 This is an example of
what behavioral economists might term “libertarian paternalism” whereby
market participants are steered in welfare-promoting directions without
removing freedom of choice.102 In this case, the law tends to reward lenders
who offer mortgages that contain better provisions for consumers, but
neither the lender nor the consumer are limited to contracts with these
98

See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002). Of course, investors did
bear the risk that the value of the securities would fall due to the underestimated risk of
sudden, widespread foreclosures due to the collapse of the real estate market.
99
See text accompanying notes 67-71, supra.
100
John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175 (2011).
101
15 U.S.C. A. § 1639c(b). Qualified mortgage loans must have no negative
amortization; no interest only payments; no balloon payments; fully amortized rates;
documentation of consumer income and financial resources; creditor compliance with
guidelines on debt-to-income ratios; total points and fees that do not exceed 3% of the total
loan amount; and the term of the loan is not greater than 30 years. 15 U.S.C.A. §
1639c(b)(2).
102
See generally Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
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terms. When lenders are steered toward these mortgages, consumers will
also be likely to go along because most mortgage agreements are offered as
standard form contracts in which it is highly unlikely that individual
consumers would have any ability to negotiate their provisions.
Third, the Mortgage Reform Act will implement a ban on broker
compensation via yield spread premiums, putting to rest a long standing
controversy that had resulted in conflicting regulations under TILA and
RESPA.103 The yield spread premium (YSP) is a form of broker
compensation in which fees are paid by the mortgage lender to the
mortgage broker based on the difference between market or par rate, and the
rate actually charged to the borrower.104 The disadvantage to consumers of
this form of compensation is that the consumer may not realize they could
have gotten a loan with a lower interest rate by using a different broker or
by negotiating an upfront fee for the broker instead of using YSP. The use
of YSP as broker compensation rewards the broker for obtaining a higher
interest rate loan, which seems like a perverse incentive, perhaps not in the
consumer’s best interest.105 Also, the use of YSP as broker compensation
made it very difficult for consumers to comparison shop for a mortgage
broker based on fees because the YSP aspect is hidden within the higher
interest rate. Prior attempts at disclosure of YSP only resulted in consumer
confusion.106 This is another example of a consumer issue with residential
mortgage lending that required stronger measures than disclosure alone.
Fourth, the new legislation places strict limits on prepayment penalties.
They are now limited in amount and duration, or banned altogether. 107 A
prepayment penalty means the borrowers pay extra if they want to pay off
the loan early, typically by re-financing or resale. The penalty is meant to
103

24 C.F.R. § 3500.7, and 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d) (the TILA regulation banning YSP
had been scheduled to go into effect in April 2011).
104
See Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004 (9 th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied 537 U.S. 1171 (2003), for a good factual example and explanation of yield spread
premiums. Formerly, YSP was governed by both RESPA as a potential illegal kickback,
and by TILA and Regulation Z, as a part of the credit cost of the loan that had to be
disclosed.
105
Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case
of Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 289 (2007).
106
In a study commissioned by the Federal Reserve Board in 2008, consumers who
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compensate the lender for the lost expected income on the loan that is not
realized due to early payment.108 Prepayment penalties, especially if they
extend for long periods of time, however, tend to discourage people from
paying off loans with unfavorable provisions by refinancing. While
prepayment penalties should be factored in as a potential cost of a loan,
many consumers do not do so because this is a long-term cost and is
contingent on an uncertain future event. These types of costs are not
noticed by the “myopic” consumer.109 When such costs are not considered,
however, a loan may appear to be cheaper than it really is. Thus, the
prepayment penalty restrictions were needed to protect consumers from this
type of hidden cost.
These and the other substantive guidelines for residential mortgage
loans, as contained in the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act, represent the new direction in consumer protection. When it appears
that disclosure alone will not protect consumers due to flaws in the
individual decision making process, or creditor abuse of consumer
weaknesses, as demonstrated by behavioral economics, the new law has
stepped in with more direct measures. This same pattern also appeared in
the earlier law governing credit cards.
B. Credit Cards
Prior to the passage of the Credit CARD Act of 2009, 110 many
consumers were plagued with large amounts of credit card debt. Congress
found that part of the reason for this debt escalation was the fact that
consumers were being “tricked and trapped” by various credit card
practices, such as teaser rates, rate-jacking (unexpected rate increases after
an account has been opened), late fees, penalty rates, over-the-limit fees,
unfair billing practices and excessive marketing to young consumers, all of
which made it difficult for consumers to manage their credit card
accounts.111 Basically this law amends TILA with specific substantive
provisions designed to address the “tricks and traps” and other specific
complaints from consumers about credit cards, although the law also
initiated certain improvements in credit card disclosures as well. In doing
so, Congress chose the path of imposing minimum substantive requirements
108
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in certain problem areas in lieu of the more traditional approach of relying
solely on disclosure and rational consumer choice.112
The Credit CARD Act’s substantive consumer protection provisions
can be divided into four categories: provisions affecting rates; billing
practices; fees; and protections for young consumers. The provisions
affecting each of these aspects of credit cards are summarized below.
One of the biggest consumer complaints leading up to the CARD
Act was the practice of credit card issuers unexpectedly increasing interest
rates on balances.113 These rate increases could be based on the unlimited
“change of terms” clauses that appeared in most credit card contracts,
“universal default” provisions that allowed creditors to increase rates based
on a consumer’s performance on other unrelated accounts, or due to
“penalty” rates imposed for a series of late payments or default.
Unexpected rate increases led to some consumers being unable to pay off
their credit card debt. The CARD Act does not impose any ceiling on credit
card interest rates, but it does limit certain practices associated with rate
increases. These substantive limits include the following:
 Creditors must provide at least 45 days’ notice of rate
increases114 and may not charge an increased rate to
prior balances115;
 “Teaser” or promotional rates must last at least six
months116;
 Creditors may not increase rates based on the
consumer’s payment pattern in connection with
other accounts (universal default) unless they meet
certain prerequisites117; and
112
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 If a rate is increased due to failure to receive the
minimum payment within 60 days after the due
date, the creditor must reinstate the prior rate if the
creditor receives the minimum required payment
for a period of six months.118
Credit card billing practices were another source of consumer
complaints prior to the passage of the CARD Act. Consumers often seek to
avoid finance charges by paying off their balances in full during the “free
ride” period. Consumers also seek to avoid late fees by paying their bills on
time. However, some creditors were known to apply a finance charge to
prior balances if the full balance was not paid off in a given month, a
practice known as “double cycle billing,” which eliminated the “free ride”
period on the prior balance for those consumers. Also, due dates were
variable, bills were mailed at such times that the “free ride” period was
shortened, and the cut-off time on the due date to avoid late fees could be at
an unexpected time of day, such as noon or early afternoon. 119 Different
rates are often charged to different types of balances, such as cash advances
versus purchases. Creditors in the past were known to apply payments first
to the balance with a lower rate, leaving more in the high rate balance. In
addition, credit card statements often encouraged, or at least did not
discourage, the payment of the minimum payment amount, which had
become increasingly small. Financially unsophisticated consumers often
did not realize the consequences of paying only the minimum amount each
month and carrying a balance, which usually resulted in payment over time
of large amounts of finance charges.120 The CARD Act attempts to address
many of these issues regarding billing practices with the following
provisions:
 Ban on “double-cycle billing,” a practice which had
eliminated the “free ride” on prior balances if
payment was not made in full by the due date121;
 Card issuers must apply the consumer’s payment first
to balances with higher rates122;
 must mail bills 21 days before the due date123;
118
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 the due date must be same every month124;
 the cutoff time to avoid late payment on the due date
must be 5PM125; and
 Card issuers must provide a minimum payment
disclosure on the monthly statement showing
payoff time and amount if only the minimum
payment is made.126

Another common complaint of credit card consumers was that the
fees being charged were unexpected, rigid, arbitrary, and seemed
disproportionate to the transgression or to the cost imposed on the card
issuer. For example, the same late fee was charged whether the payment
was one day late or much later, and whether the balance was $5 or $500.
“Back-end” credit card fees had become a large percentage of card issuer
revenue in the lead-up to the financial crisis. Consumers, on the other hand,
due to hyperbolic discounting, over-optimism, and a focus on salient
features, failed to factor in the amount they were likely to pay in fees when
comparison shopping for the best deal in credit cards.127 Many consumers
did not expect to be charged over-the-limit fees without being notified at the
point of sale that their transaction was refused.128 Other one-time or annual
fees for subprime consumers were especially burdensome, sometimes
leaving very little credit available for their use until the initial fees were
paid.129 Following are some of the provisions of the CARD Act that
address the issues associated with credit card fees:
 Penalties and fees must be “reasonable and
proportional” to the omission or violation for which
they are imposed.130 Under the relevant
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regulations, most late payment fees are limited to
$25 or $35 and over-limit fees are capped at $35.131
 Over-the-limit fees must be expressly elected by
consumers to permit creditors to charge a fee to
complete transactions involving the extension of
credit in excess of the amount of authorized credit
for the account being used.132
 Fees (other than late fees, over-the-limit fees, or fees
for returned payments) cannot be more than 25% of
available credit in the first 12 months (no “fee
harvester” cards)133.
In passing the Credit CARD Act, Congress was particularly
concerned about vulnerable consumers, such as college students, who were
being bombarded with on-campus credit card marketing, only to wind up
with large amounts of credit card debt they could not handle. 134 In response
to these concerns, the Credit CARD Act contains a provision that prohibits
the issuance of a credit card to consumers who are under 21 unless they
have a co-signor who is twenty-one or older and is financially responsible,
or unless the young consumer can show they have independent means of
repaying the obligation.135 This appears at first glance to be a rather
extensive restriction on credit cards for young people. However, some have
criticized the measure for not going far enough to protect young people.136
The regulations implementing the statute say that the card issuer can look at
the consumer’s ability to repay only the minimum payment, and can look to
sources of income in the future, like seasonal work.137 Thus, relatively
under-employed college students under the age of 21 are still likely to be
able to obtain credit cards, despite the provisions of the Act. Also, the cosignor provisions, while likely aimed at parents or guardians, actually allow
slightly older college friends who are at least twenty-one, to co-sign for a
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younger classmate, even though the co-signor may not be any more mature
than the card applicant, and may end up saddled with their friend’s
improvident credit card debt.138 Critics of the young consumer credit card
protections say that these restrictions are contrary to the prevailing law of
majority for most other contracts (set at 18), and will cut off an important
source of credit for young entrepreneurs.139 The current situation appears to
be that it is more difficult for college-age consumers to obtain a credit card,
but it is far from impossible.140 Perhaps the added hurdles will inspire some
caution on the part of young consumers. At least the days when students
signed up for a credit card to get a free tee-shirt appear to be a thing of the
past.
IV. Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection – Are They
Good or Bad?

The sea changes in consumer protection law outlined in this article
are not without critics, of course. Any new direction in public policy will be
hotly debated. So what are the major arguments pro and con in this area?
A brief overview follows.
One of the major arguments for basing consumer protection rules
on rational consumer choice theory, rather than behavioral economics, is
that both antitrust and consumer protection law should be based on the same
consumer welfare theories. Rational consumer choice theory, which has
long been the bedrock principle of antitrust, is itself based on the principle
of consumer sovereignty where consumers’ revealed preferences in the
marketplace dictate policy.141 Thus, in the model of perfect competition,
informed consumers acting rationally in the marketplace, unhindered by
market failures or anticompetitive conspiracies, will achieve allocative
efficiency, such that the economy produces the goods consumers want at a
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competitive price. 142 The same theory carries over to consumer protection
laws such as Truth in Lending, where the purpose of the law is to promote
informed consumer choice in a competitive market for consumer credit,
which in turn will maximize consumer welfare.
The use of behavioral economics, on the other hand, especially
when it comes to providing a justification for specific substantive
protections for consumers, arguably could mean that consumer choices are
controlled more by the government and less by consumers themselves.143
If consumers cannot for psychological/sociological reasons make selfinterested rational choices in certain situations, then to protect them a third
party (a legislature or government agency) may have to determine what is a
rational choice for consumers and what is not. This could occur by
regulations banning certain credit practices, such as the use of yield spread
premiums for mortgage broker compensation, as opposed to simply warning
consumers about the potential consequences but allowing such contracts to
go forward. Or it could be a form of “nudge” or “debiasing” by which the
regulatory provision requires that the default choice for the consumer is the
one deemed most rational, while still allowing consumers to opt out and
make a different choice should they so desire.144 Some say this will result
in the “nirvana fallacy,” i.e., the false idea that such third parties can in fact
determine and promote the “true preferences” of consumers.145 Others
point out that government policy makers are also human and could
themselves fall victim to behavioral biases, potentially undermining the
rationality of the regulatory choices.146 Still others call approaches based
on behavioral economics the “new paternalism.” 147
While to critics the ascendancy of behavioral economics as a basis
for consumer protection policy may be cause for concern, to others this
particular discipline seems more realistic than rational consumer choice
theory as a basis for understanding marketplace behavior.148 It also
142
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comports with everyday experience. The insights of behavioral economics
also can be used to explain the failure of the disclosure regime of the Truth
in Lending Act.149 Why did consumers persist in signing residential
mortgages that had unaffordable costs and unfavorable provisions that were
clearly disclosed to them if consumers always act rationally in their own
self-interest if provided with adequate information?
Some of the
phenomena discussed above, such as bounded rationality, myopia, optimism
and trust of authority figures, concepts that have been associated with
behavioral economics, can help explain this paradox.150 The new approach
to consumer protection also addresses the balance of power between
consumers and marketers. Individual consumers are hampered by cognitive
barriers on a daily basis in a wide variety of transactions, whereas marketers
have the time and resources to study human behavior in a focused way and
try to use what they learn to sell their products.151 Note that both marketers
and government regulators are indeed “human,” and subject to behavioral
biases, but unlike consumers, the human marketers and regulators have the
luxury that consumers do not have to take the time to study the market
choices as well as the consumer behavioral data to support their actions.
Finally, the application of behavioral economics does not mean that the
reliance on competitive markets as the best way to promote consumer
welfare has been abandoned. Rather, there has been a renewed recognition
that when the competitive marketplace suffers from a lack of transparency
and fairness, it will not fulfill its proper function. Thus, Congress charged
the new CFPB to ensure that “all consumers have access to markets for
consumer financial products and services and that markets for consumer
financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”152
Some new initiatives in consumer credit regulation also take the approach
of “nudging” better choices, such as by establishing a “safe harbor” for
mortgage lenders who offer consumers a “qualified mortgage,” rather than
simply requiring all mortgages to have these provisions.153 Rather than
taking away consumers’ “liberty” to be victimized by unfair or deceptive
creditor practices, these new laws, based in part on behavioral economics,
allow competition to occur on a level playing field and with minimum rules
(2005).
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of safety and fairness.154
Another critique of the focus on specific creditor practices or
contract clauses is that such an approach will be only a temporary fix and is
doomed to fail in the long run. Once a specific practice is prohibited by
law, it is posited that the market or the development of new technologies
will devise a “work-around” that is not prohibited but that achieves the
same result. For example, if creditor fee x is banned or limited, creditor fee
y will replace it.
This insight was part of the reason for endowing
traditional
consumer protection agencies, such as the FTC, with general
authority over “unfair and deceptive trade practices,” so that new and
unforeseen forms of consumer abuse can be dealt with as they arise. As
stated in the House Conference Report on the original FTC Act:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all
unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in
this field.
Even if all known unfair practices were
specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once
necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to adopt the
method of definition, it would undertake an endless task.155
In setting up the CFPB, Congress gave the agency very specific
mandates in some parts of the law, such as the Mortgage Reform Act, but
also gave the agency authority over “unfair, deceptive or abusive” practices
in the relevant financial sectors.156 Thus there is the potential for the CFPB
to address unforeseen consumer abuses that have not even been imagined at
the time the law was written. This is particularly true with regard to the
“abusive” practices standard, which allows the CFPB to regulate in
instances where credit practice “materially interferes with the ability of a
consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product
or service,” or where financial service providers “take unreasonable
advantage of” the consumer’s lack of understanding or inability to protect
their own interests.157 One author has stated that the CFPB’s “anti-abuse
regulation based on behavioral economics promises to be an important
development, arguably the most significant innovation in consumer law in
decades.”158
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The new consumer protection legislation discussed here, like all new
legislation, will involve some costs as well as benefits. The consumer
credit market was already regulated prior to the new laws and the new
agency and so the question is raised whether or not the costs outweigh the
potential benefits. For better or worse, in order to achieve any benefit from
new consumer protections, there will be costs imposed on the regulated
parties and indirectly on society as a whole. In this case, the potential
benefit to consumers in the form of protection from harmful choices is
difficult to measure, because basically the benefit is in not doing something
that might have been harmful. So it is akin to trying to prove a negative.
The cost to creditors of new regulations, simply in terms of transition and
compliance costs, on the other hand, is readily quantified by the regulated
industry. The benefit/cost issue is a legitimate question, and the answer will
not be known until the new regulatory wave is fully played out. Congress
has arguably anticipated this issue by stipulating that the CFPB must
conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the effects of any new rules on both
consumers and creditors.159 Any reduction in the likelihood of future
financial crises would be a benefit worth some cost.
Another related criticism of the new consumer protection approach
in the credit market is that these new laws will reduce the supply of
consumer credit by raising costs to creditors who will in turn pass on these
higher costs to consumers. 160 This fear of the high cost of compliance has
inevitably accompanied any new initiative to protect consumers, but often
proves to be exaggerated. For instance, in 1975 at a Congressional hearing
to consider amending the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to require notices of
reasons for adverse action, it was reported that Sears Roebuck & Company
had estimated the cost for compliance would be approximately $5 per letter.
After the law was enacted, Sears reported to the Federal Reserve Board that
the actual average cost of compliance with this particular requirement was
59 cents per letter.161 More recently, the new consumer protection rules for
credit cards contained in the CARD Act of 2009 were claimed to be likely
to restrict access to consumer credit and raise its cost. A study by the
41, at 4. Despite this broad grant of authority, however, the CFPB is constrained by the
statutory definitions of these general terms, as well as indirectly by years of FTC precedent
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159
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160
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Center for Responsible Learning, however, showed that one year after the
legislation went into effect, there was an increased transparency of credit
card pricing , credit card prices remained level, and the supply of credit
cards was not constricted.162
Some of these new laws will prevent some people from obtaining
credit, who otherwise would have been able to do so. Indeed, there will
soon be a duty imposed on lenders to assure a borrower’s ability to repay in
all residential mortgage loans163 as well as credit card accounts.164 The
Credit CARD Act also bans the extension of credit in the form of credit
cards to all consumers under the age of 21, subject to narrow exceptions
that focus on their ability to repay.165 These requirements, by definition,
will eliminate some borrowers who might otherwise have been able to
obtain loans, however improvident they might have been. The business
community argues that they and individual consumers are in the best
position to decide creditworthiness, without having to comply with
government standards.166 On the other hand, this denial of mortgages or
credit cards to persons who lack the ability to pay for these items was
deemed necessary to counteract the tidal wave of predatory lending that led
up to the financial crisis.167 Avoiding the improvident extension of credit to
persons who lack the ability to repay can also protect society and the
economy as a whole. It is well known that an increase in the financial
distress of consumers can have effects not only on the individual or
individuals immediately involved, but also on their family, their
neighborhood (foreclosure blight), and their creditors (assuming bankruptcy
or default). Indeed, it could be argued that improvident lending brought
down the U.S. economy and led to the Great Recession of 2008.
Finally, critics of the CFPB are concerned that the new agency is not
only strong but perhaps too strong, that it lacks sufficient Congressional
oversight and has too broad a mandate. Some may favor the more
traditional independent regulatory commission structure of the Federal
Trade Commission, which is more directly controlled by Congress, rather
than the relatively independent CFPB structure. Many are fearful of the
potential flood of new federal regulation that may be heading toward the
consumer financial sector as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act. 168 Players in
162
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the fringe banking sectors like payday lending, pawn broking and
automobile title lenders will be subject to federal regulation for the first
time.169 Giving the CFPB authority not only over unfair and deceptive
consumer credit practices, but also over “abusive” practices is also a point
of concern because this is uncharted water for consumer financial
regulation.170
Despite the misgivings of some, it is clear that the creation of the
CFPB was necessary to provide more effective consumer protection. The
legislative blueprint for the CFPB has succeeded in uniting the previously
balkanized regulation of the consumer financial sector by consolidating
functions that were spread out over the bank regulatory agencies and the
FTC.171 This change alone eliminated the prior issues of conflicted
missions, lack of focus and regulated entities shopping for favorable
regulators. Also, although the CFPB is not directly funded by Congress, the
Bureau must be audited annually by the Comptroller General, and the
director must submit an annual report to Congress on its operations.172 This
seems like a reasonable compromise between the situation of an agency like
the FTC, which can be effectively muzzled by political pressure, and a
completely unaccountable agency (which the CFPB is not). Placing nonbank “fringe” providers under some federal supervision is not simply
gratuitous regulation. This sector deals with the financially vulnerable and
the industry players were not constrained in the same ways as their
counterparts in the banking industry. Thus, extending regulation to this
sector may mean more uniform rules for credit products, regardless of their
source. Finally, the extension of authority to “abusive” practices was
necessary to address marketing practices that exploit consumer weakness,
and that were not adequately remedied by disclosure along. Nonetheless, it
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is not an unlimited grant of power. The statute contains a specific definition
of “abusive,” that focuses on practices that interfere with the ability of
consumers to understand the terms and conditions they are being offered, or
that take unreasonable advantage of the consumer’s lack of understanding,
inability to protect their own interests, or reasonable reliance on a trusted
advisor.173
V. Conclusion
These are indeed exciting and turbulent times for consumer
protection law. With the creation of the new Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and associated changes in the substance of federal
consumer credit laws, the field is undergoing “sea-changes” that will play
out for years to come. The new agency was established to unite the
previously diffuse regulation of providers in the consumer financial services
sector, changing from shared authority among the Federal Reserve Board,
other bank regulatory agencies, and the FTC, to regulation under a single
authority. The CFPB was set up in a way that gives it the potential to be
more powerful and more effective than its older predecessor in the federal
consumer protection arena, the FTC, because it has a single director not a
Commission, with funding from the Federal Reserve System not Congress,
and has authority to police unfair, deceptive and abusive consumer financial
practices. At the same time, the law that created the CFPB also gives states
more of an ability to raise the level of consumer protection by sharply
curbing the federal preemption power, which had previously been used to
prevent states from reacting to predatory lending abuses without any
corresponding federal regulations.
This new approach to consumer protection embodied in the CFPB
itself and in the new legislation that it will administer, is widely understood
to owe its theoretical foundation to the field known as “behavioral
economics.” This body of scholarship points out that contrary to the
teachings of classical economics, the average consumer does not always act
as “homo economicus,” making rational choices to maximize individual
welfare in all transactions. Behavioral economics has forwarded the
seemingly common sense insight that consumers can be pushed toward
irrational marketplace choices by the exploitation of certain cognitive
barriers that we all experience. This perceived consumer irrationality does
not mean that all consumers act irrationally in all their choices. Nor does
the new approach to consumer protection mean that we are doomed to exist
in a world where self-righteous government bureaucrats dole out “plain
vanilla” goods that they think are best for the population. On the contrary,
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behavioral economics simply points out that certain types of market
practices or manipulations tend to block rational consumer choice in certain
situations. One insight of behavioral economics is that sometimes pure
information may not be enough to protect consumers, due to the
circumstances in which the consumer choice is being made. Thus, laws that
attempt to eliminate specific distorting or exploiting practices, or that use
pro-consumer defaults or other forms of “soft paternalism” to “nudge”
consumers to better choices, will assist consumers in making rational
choices in the marketplace. The “sea change” in consumer protection, as
fundamental as it is, does not in the end eliminate free consumer choice in a
free market. It simply recognizes the practical limits and the artificiality of
putting all the responsibility for consumer protection on individual
consumers. The government and the financial service providers must also
do their part.

